Policing
by Cultural Norms
The
power of conformity inhibits impulses to define, to name, to act
contrary to the group norm. Shelby Steele writes of a conformity by
blacks that “amounts to a self-protective collectivism” leading
to a “diminished sense of possibility”. Steele advocates
“pushing the collective identity out of our individual space” in
order to utilize the classically American and middle class profile of
“hard work, self-reliance, initiative, property ownership, family
ties, and so on”. A problem for non-immigrant African-Americans,
then (including myself), is the problem of identity. Conformity
retards its solution.
I
have no memory of my parents reading to me; although, I was taught to
read on my own at an early age. Additionally, I have not forgotten
the fairy tales my maternal grandmother read to me many years ago.
They function now, as then, to create an image of reality that is
more stable than uncertain. The vivid oversimplifications of fairy
tales seduce my feelings through memory to construct a world without
disorder, without gods, with absolute principles of right and wrong.
It was for these reasons that I recalled Hans Christian Andersen’s
The
Emperor’s New Clothes
while reading Steele’s book. The fairy tale, too, was a lesson
about conformity. The Emperor’s subjects complied with the opinion
of others and praised his non-existent robes. The subjects of Shelby
Steele’s essay conform to a political and social agenda demanding a
construction of reality in which non-immigrant African-Americans are
perpetually victimized by a hostile dominant culture. In both
accounts, individuals modified their beliefs, attitudes, values,
group-membership, and behaviors to match those of the people around
them.
Social
psychologists have studied conformity since the 1930s and classify it
with other modes of “social influence,” interpersonal mechanisms
that affect emotions, thoughts, or actions. Conformity may also
require “obedience” to an authority figure (a king in Andersen’s
story, political leaders in Steele’s view). In these cases,
“individuality” is subordinated to group interests and norms as a
result of deception, compliance, or conversion.
If
conformity occurs in association with deception, the deceiver (or
social parasite) may experience the “ingratiator’s dilemma”
described by Edward Jones in 1990. This problem arises because
deception is more likely to be detected as the motivation to deceive
increases. The “ingratiator’s dilemma” formalizes the
potential advantages and disadvantages of conformity, in particular,
the prediction that costs increase with increases in benefits. When
conformity is used to manipulate others, it may be viewed as a
strategy serving the self-interests of the deceiver, and the
manipulator may be expected to optimize her benefit to cost ratio.
Steele does not imply that conformity by non-immigrant
African-Americans is a function of deception, but it is worthy of
consideration that some non-immigrant African-Americans may
ingratiate others by parasitizing systems of rewards associated with
the perpetuation of what Steele calls the “rhetoric” of
non-immigrant African-American victimization (e.g., affirmative
action, welfare, and other entitlements and incentives to conform).
Related
to conformity that deceives is “compliance” in which individuals
publically agree but privately disagree with a group or majority
opinion, belief, or norm. The Emperor’s subjects were in
compliance about his dress but did not change their personal views
that the clothes were imaginary. This condition has generated
classic studies by Muzafer Sherif in the 1930s and Soloman Asch in
the 1950s confirming the observations of Hans Christian Andersen.
Studying subjects in the laboratory, Sherif and Asch found that most
subjects conformed to group opinion at least some of the time, though
subsequent research has shown that the likelihood of compliance can
be affected by situational variables such as group size, diversity,
and the presence or absence of allies. These bodies of work lead to
the conclusion that conformity among non-immigrant African-Americans
is not inevitable and that the environment might be manipulated in a
way that maximizes the likelihood of individual expression and
autonomy (and, accountability?). Rather than popularizing athletes
and entertainers, for example, the media might display black
mathematicians, geneticists, IT specialists, or blue-collar workers
of note.
Sherif’s
studies, unlike Asch’s, were conducted under conditions of
uncertainty—subjects were unclear about the correct judgment. This
condition probably mimics most situations in the real world. Sherif
was of the opinion that the cohesive properties of social
organization are a function of conformity rather than interindividual
conflicts of interest because individuals use others as social
comparison to stabilize unpredictable situations. In Asch’s
studies, 24% of the experimental subjects never complied, showing
that individuality is not necessarily relinquished in the presence of
social pressure.
Consistent
with the idea that conformity may be associated with both costs and
benefits, Thomas Henry Huxley stated, “If individuality has no
play, society does not advance; if individuality breaks out of all
bounds, society perishes.” Conformity and individuality, then,
must be balanced in order to benefit social organization over the
long-term. Studies are required to determine whether non-immigrant
African-Americans are more likely to conform than Caucasians and, if
so, what developmental factors may account for Steele’s
observations? Indeed, Steele suggests that non-immigrant
African-Americans are more subject to conformity than other members
of society because of benefits and power associated with a collective
identity based upon victimization. If this is true, then, the
behaviors associated with collective responses may be very difficult
to modify since they will be associated with generations of cultural
conditioning, rituals, and programming.
A
third form of conformity, “conversion,” occurs when individuals
change their independent views and accept those of the group. The
extreme political stances of some non-immigrant African-American
politicians may represent such behavior. While less is known
empirically about the causes and consequences of conversion compared
with compliance, it is clear that for this type of conformity to
operate, individuality must be subordinated to group opinion.
Whereas Andersen’s fairy tale provides a measure of comfort because
identity is not completely overwhelmed by group pressure, the “true
believers” of Louis Farrakhan’s cabal transmit a fierce and
cult-like intensity that mocks the outsider and may be threatening to
him.
Asch
found that conformity peaked at a group size of about 7 in which
about 37.1% of all group members complied with social opinion.
Several other researchers have investigated these relationships, and
two theories have been proposed to explain them. The “social
impact theory” of Bibb Latané
and Sharon Wolf, proposed in the 1980s, holds that increasing the
number of influential group members increases their stimulus value
and, thus, conformity, but the cumulative rate of increase decreases
over time. In Asch’s study, then, the first influential group
member would have the greatest impact on the potential conformist.
Group size effects would peak and, eventually, decline due to the
decreasing impact of each additional social influence.
Another
theory was also proposed in the 1980s by Brian Mullen, emphasizing
“self-attention.” This view, which emphasizes cognitive
processes, makes the same predictions as Latané
and Wolf’s theory, but by different mechanisms. According to
Mullen, individuals are more likely to conform when attention to
their “public selves” is increased. Needs to impress others and
to behave appropriately increase self-awareness in the face of social
influence, decreasing the individual’s resistance to conformity as
group size increases. While these theories describe certain features
of conformity behavior, they do not explain why individuals comply or
convert in the first place.
In
the 1950s, Richard Crutchfield suggested that conformity and
independence may be personality traits. Studying individuals in the
laboratory, Crutchfield differentiated them according to reliable
clusters of characteristics. Conforming personalities were
“submissive” and “accepting”; independent types,
“self-reliant.” Subsequent studies have supported Crutchfield’s
findings, but methodological problems limit the power of these
inferences. Nevertheless, Crutchfield’s work raises the
possibility that individuals may be biologically predisposed to
behave in a conforming or an independent manner since personality
“traits” are thought to have a significant intrinsic, hard-wired
component.
Few
would argue that humans, like other social organisms, possess a need
to affiliate with members of their own (and, possibly, other)
species. It may be possible to trace the evolutionary origins of
conformity, also. Michael Ryan has reviewed studies in which female
fish and birds “copy” the mate preferences of other females of
their own species, possibly because of benefits intrinsic to copying
itself or because of “conspecific cueing,” a form of “social
facilitation” whereby arousal and consequent performance are
enhanced in the presence of other individuals. Various processes of
social influence have, also, been described for non-human primates
and dolphins by R.W. Byrne in his 1994 review of social learning,
“imitation that could use impersonation to copy details.” If
conformity in humans is evolutionarily related to (by descent or
convergence) mechanisms of social influence in other species, are
there advantages to lifetime survival and reproductive success
(“fitness”) that continue to favor deception and cheating?
In
1995, Donelson Forsyth reviewed the three possible proximate
consequences of conformity. The conformer may gain from
“informational influence” in which the observation of others’
behaviors provides new information about the environment (“social”
or “observational” learning). Second, “normative influence”
may or may not serve the interests of the conformer who responds to
social influence to comply with or convert to group norms. In the
third case, “interpersonal influence” (a type of power relation),
the conformer may comply or convert because of differential rewards
or punishments. The study of coercion in social species is an active
area of research documenting the widespread efficacy of harassment
and punishment to inhibit, redirect, or otherwise modify behavior.
Indeed, the avoidance
of harassment, punishment or pain (“negative reinforcement”) may
explain the advantages of compliance and conversion but cannot
explain deception or cheating or why conformers fail to switch to
another group with lower costs from social influence or conformity.
Forsyth’s work reminds us that social organisms must navigate their
environments via sometimes complex networks whose rules may change
from space to space (as Stuart Hall has pointed out).
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